Abstract-This paper proposes a distributed methodology for detecting and isolating multiple sensor faults in interconnected cyber-physical systems. The distributed sensor fault detection and isolation process is conducted in the cyber superstratum, in two levels. The first-level diagnosis is based on the design of monitoring agents, where every agent is dedicated to a corresponding interconnected subsystem. The monitoring agent is designed to isolate multiple sensor faults occurring in the sensor set of the physical part, while it is allowed to exchange information with its neighboring monitoring agents. The second-level diagnosis is realized by applying a global decision logic designed to isolate multiple sensor faults that may propagate in the cyber superstratum through the exchange of information between monitoring agents. The decision-making process, executed in both levels of diagnosis, relies on a multiple sensor fault combinatorial logic and diagnostic reasoning. The performance of the proposed methodology is analyzed with respect to the sensor fault propagation effects and the distributed sensor fault detectability.
I. INTRODUCTION

R
ECENT advances in information and communication technologies, embedded systems, and sensor networks have generated significant research activity in the development of the so-called cyber-physical systems (CPSs). According to [1] , CPSs consist of: 1) physical, biological; or engineered systems that are usually large-scale and complex, and 2) a cyber core, comprised of communication networks and computational availability that monitors, coordinates, and controls the physical part. The focus of CPSs is to improve the collaborative link between physical and computational (cyber) elements for increased adaptability, efficiency, and autonomy. The key motivation for migrating from "conventional" systems to CPSs is the need for enhancing the "intelligence" of the physical systems used in many application domains in order to be able to plan and modify their actions based on self-awareness and the evolving environment, and for handling a huge amount of data of different time and space characteristics.
Among the key challenges in designing CPSs are safety, reliability, and fault tolerance. For meeting these challenges, the cyber core should be empowered with supervision capabilities for diagnosing faults in the physical part and compensating their effects by taking appropriate remedial actions [2] , [3] . Various methodologies have been developed for tackling the problem of fault diagnosis in the framework of actuator/sensor faults and especially process faults. Recently, the detection and isolation of sensor faults have become of paramount importance, mainly as a result of the large number of sensors and sensor networks, used for: 1) monitoring and controlling large-scale CPSs; 2) providing rich and redundant information for executing safety-critical tasks; and 3) offering information to the citizens and governmental agencies for resolving problems promptly in emergency situations.
The emerging applications of CPSs with multiple sensors can be found in intelligent transportation, smart buildings, smart grids, mobile robotics, and many more. For instance, in intelligent transportation, vehicles may be equipped with odometers, lasers, frontal camera video-sensors, global positioning systems (GPS), speed, or object-tracking sensors, in order to acquire and broadcast information aimed at performing tasks, such as cooperative or fully autonomous driving, avoiding lane departure and collision, etc. In smart buildings, multiple sensors are installed in different zones (e.g., temperature sensor, humidity sensor, CO 2 sensor, contaminant concentration sensor, infrared occupancy sensor), as well as in the electromechanical part of heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning systems for measuring supply/return/mixed air temperature, supply/return air differential pressure, return air humidity, etc. This sensing information may be used for reducing the energy consumption of a building and maintaining the desired living conditions, while executing evacuation plans in safety-critical situations (e.g., fire). Any undetected sensor faults can have severe consequences, possibly leading to system instability, loss of information fidelity, incorrect decisions, and disorientation of remedial actions.
Due to the large-scale and complex nature of physical systems, it is convenient to model a CPS as a set of interconnected subsystems of lower dimension. In this context, decentralized and distributed approaches are commonly adopted for online fault detection and isolation (FDI) . The common characteristic of model-based decentralized and distributed FDI schemes 2325-5870 © 2015 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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is the development of local monitoring units that perform a diagnosis based on local models describing the interconnected subsystems. The classification of these schemes relies on the type of system interconnections, the cyber levels of diagnosis, the task of the local diagnosers, as well as the type of communication and information exchanged between the local and highlevel diagnosers. The design of model-based techniques for interconnected systems requires some prior knowledge related to the physical subsystems and the interconnections.
In [4] - [10] , decentralized and distributed FDI methods are developed for physically interconnected subsystems. Distributed architectures have also been designed for systems with interconnections in the control law [11] , interconnected inputs [12] , or sensing interconnections (i.e., relative output measurements) [13] . To enhance fault isolation, multiple levels of diagnosis have been designed. In particular, while the singlelevel diagnosis is realized by the local diagnosers [4] - [6] , [11] - [13] , additional FDI units are developed, aggregating and processing the outputs of the local diagnosers [7] - [10] . The decentralized or distributed nature of the FDI process is related either to the task executed by the local diagnosers, or to the communication between the local diagnosers. In decentralized schemes, a local diagnoser is commonly designed to detect and isolate faults only in its underlying system [4] , [6] , while it may not exchange any information with other local diagnosers [9] , [10] . On the contrary, in distributed schemes, there is communication between the local diagnosers and every local diagnoser can detect and isolate faults in neighboring systems [5] , [7] , [8] , [11] - [13] . The design of distributed FDI architectures may also differ in the type of exchanged information. Specifically, the local diagnosers may exchange estimations [5] , [4] , [12] , or measurements [7] , [8] , [11] of the interconnected states, or fault signatures [12] . In multilevel FDI schemes, the communication between levels is commonly sporadic and event driven, while the information transmitted to higher levels can be the decisions of the local diagnosers [7] , [8] , the time instances of fault detection of the local diagnosers [9] , or the calculated analytical redundancy relations [10] .
Among distributed and decentralized FDI schemes for physically interconnected systems, there are very few results in sensor fault diagnosis. In [14] and [15] , a distributed architecture has been designed for isolating a single sensor fault that may occur in one of the nonlinear subsystems. In [16] and [17] , local monitoring agents, which do not exchange any information, are used for isolating multiple sensor faults that may affect more than one interconnected, nonlinear subsystem.
The goal and the main contribution of this paper is the design and analysis of a fault diagnosis methodology with emphasis on the distributed isolation of multiple sensor faults that may affect the physical part of multiple interconnected cyber-physical systems, which may exchange sensor information related to the physical interconnections. The backbone of the proposed distributed scheme is the use of a bank of agents, which are implemented in the cyber core of the interconnected CPSs and monitor the sensor sets of the CPSs. A global decision logic is designed for the isolation of sensor faults that propagate between the interconnected CPSs through the exchange of sensor information, which is necessary for enhancing the distributed sensor fault detectability. This exchange of information is crucial and has significant practical implications, since it provides the necessary redundancy to isolate multiple faults in large-scale dynamical systems. The intuitive rationale behind the global decision logic relies on the diagnosis capabilities of a monitoring agent, which is specifically designed using a bank of observer-based modules that are robust against modeling uncertainties and structurally sensitive to propagated sensor faults and faults that occur in smaller local sensor sets of the underlying CPS, while being affected by local sensor faults in a different way than being affected by propagated sensor faults.
The local sensor sets result from the decomposition of the sensor set of the corresponding CPS, necessary for resolving efficiently the problem of isolating multiple sensor faults in possibly large-scale and nonlinear CPS, and recognizing propagating sensor faults. The decision logic of a monitoring module relies on analytical redundancy relations of residuals and adaptive thresholds, derived using a nonlinear Lipschitz observer. The design of the nonlinear observer is realized by taking into account certain conditions that ensure the stability of the nonlinear estimation error dynamics, using the measurements of the underlying local sensor set and the sensor information transmitted from neighboring CPSs. These conditions are used to quantitatively analyze the distributed sensor fault effects.
The isolation decision logic applied locally, by combining the decisions of the monitoring modules, and globally, by combining the decisions of the monitoring agents of the CPS, relies on diagnostic reasoning using sensor fault signature matrices. The proposed distributed diagnostic reasoning and fault signature matrices are formulated by taking into account the robustness and structured fault sensitivity properties, as well as the quantitative analysis of the local and propagated sensor fault effects, enabling the isolation of multiple sensor faults that impact the network of the interconnected CPSs. This work is based on some preliminary results on distributed sensor fault diagnosis in [18] , while offering a general design and analysis framework for diagnosing multiple sensor faults that may affect the physical layer of the operation of a network of CPSs and may propagate in the cyber superstratum. This paper is organized as follows. The problem formulation is described in Section II, while the overall architecture of the distributed sensor FDI method for a network of CPSs is presented in Section III. The distributed sensor fault detection and isolation procedures are described in Sections IV and V, respectively. The performance of the proposed methodology is analyzed in Section VI. A simple two-zone heating ventilation and air-conditioning (HVAC) system is provided in Section VII for illustrating the application of the proposed method, followed by some concluding remarks in Section VIII.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a network of N interconnected CPSs. The Ith CPS I ∈ {1, . . . , N} is described by the pair (P , and a set of sensors, denoted by S (I) , that is
where 
, u (I) ) represents the known local dynamics, while
, representing various sources of uncertainty, such as linearization error, uncertainty in the model's parameters, or system disturbances, etc. The input vector u (I) is generated by a control agent, denoted by K
, which is implemented in the cyber part C 
(t).
The sensor set of P (I) is described by
where {j}, j ∈ {1, . . . , m I } is described by
where f , modeled as
where β 
In the presence of a single or multiple sensor faults, it is important that the monitoring system be able to diagnose the faults as quickly and accurately as possible before they lead to catastrophic failures or propagate to other CPSs through the distributed control scheme. The objective of this paper is to design and analyze a methodology for detecting and isolating multiple sensor faults that may occur in one or more CPSs. The following assumptions are made throughout this paper: , remain uniformly bounded before and after the occurrence of multiple sensor faults; that is, there exist compact regions of stability
The nonlinear vector field γ (I) is locally Lipschitz in x (I) ∈ X I , for all u (I) ∈ U I and t ≥ 0, while h
is locally Lipschitz in x (I) ∈ X I and z (I) ∈ Z I , for all u (I) ∈ U I and t ≥ 0. The vector space Z I ⊂ R q I denotes a compact region of stability within which z (I) resides. Assumption 3: The unknown modeling uncertainty η (I) is bounded by a known functional boundη
, u
whereas the functional boundη (I) is locally Lipschitz in x (I) ∈ X I and z (I) ∈ Z I , for all u (I) ∈ U I and t ≥ 0. Assumption 4: The noise affecting the sensor S (I) {j} is unknown but uniformly bounded, that is, |d
j is a known constant bound. Assumption 1 is a well-posed condition, requiring that the feedback controller retain the boundedness of the state variables in the presence of sensor faults. This assumption is necessary due to the fact that, in this paper, we do not address the fault accommodation problem, but only fault detection and isolation issues. Assumption 2 characterizes the class of nonlinear interconnected systems under consideration. Many nonlinearities in practical systems can be considered as locally Lipschitz [4] , [19] , [20] . Assumption 3 provides a bound commonly used for distinguishing between modeling uncertainties and faults. This bound can be obtained either analytically, by explicitly determining the sources of uncertainty and their corresponding bounds, or using offline identification techniques. Assumption 4 describes a practical representation of the available knowledge for the sensor noise that is typically provided in a given range of operation by sensor manufacturers or introduced when a noisefree analog signal is converted into a digital one with a finite number of digits.
III. SENSOR FAULT DIAGNOSIS ARCHITECTURE
The cyber part C (I) of the interconnected CPSs consists of the monitoring agent, denoted by M (I) , associated with each interconnected subsystem and the control agent K (I) . The objective of this paper is the design of the monitoring agent M (I) for multiple sensor faults, with emphasis on the communication between neighboring monitoring agents and the decision logic for sensor fault isolation. The overall architecture of the proposed distributed sensor fault detection and isolation (SFDI) method is illustrated in Fig. 1 . The distributed SFDI process is realized in the cyber superstratum, in two levels. The first-level diagnosis M (I) , shown in Fig. 2 , is designed to detect and isolate multiple sensor faults that may directly affect some sensors in S (I) associated with the underlying system Σ
(I)
. The second-level diagnosis, denoted by G, utilizes information (depicted as dashed arrows in Fig. 1 ) from the . The exchanged information corresponds to the form of the physical interconnections, that is, unidirectional or bidirectional interactions between interconnected subsystems (white, solid arrows in Fig. 1 ). In particular, neighboring monitoring agents can exchange data provided by the sensors that measure the interconnection states z (I) . The sensor information transmitted to the agent M (I) , denoted by S (I) z , is characterized by the output vector y
where d
z ∈ R p I are the noise and sensor fault vector, respectively.
A fault in the sensor set S (I) can be propagated to neighboring cyber modules due to the information exchange between the agent M (I) and the neighboring monitoring agents, as depicted in Fig. 2 . Allowing the exchange of sensor information between monitoring agents can enhance sensor fault detectability, compared to a decentralized architecture with no communication between the monitoring agents, where usually the effects of interconnections are treated as bounded disturbances [16] , [17] . On the other hand, the exchange of information may cause fault propagation, which complicates the isolation of faulty sensors. This issue is addressed in Section V with the design of a global decision logic. It is important to note that the propagation of sensor faults may occur not only in the monitoring agents but also in the control agents in the case of a distributed control architecture; however, the design of the control and fault accommodation scheme is beyond the scope of this paper.
Typically, in large-scale applications, the sensor set S (I) may consist of a large number of sensors, thus making the detection and especially the isolation of multiple sensor faults very difficult and sometimes unfeasible with a single module. The design of the agent M (I) relies on the decomposition of the monitoring of the sensor set S (I) into smaller local sensor sets that may be distinct or overlap [17] . The qth local sensor set, denoted by S (I,q) , consists of m I,q sensors of S (I) and is characterized by the output vector y (I,q) ∈ R m I,q , i.e.,
where
, and y
represents a column vector made up of m I,q elements of y (I) (correspondingly for d (I,q) and f (I,q) ). A decomposition procedure that can ensure the design of stable observers of the monitoring modules (presented in Section IV-A), and can enhance the multiple sensor fault isolability is proposed in [17] .
For each local sensor set, we design a dedicated module M (I,q) , which uses the measurements of S (I,q) , as well as the sensor information y z , which may be faulty, thus affecting the decision of M (I,q) , i.e., the module M (I,q) cannot distinguish between sensor faults in S (I,q) and propagated sensor faults. Due to this fact as well as due to the possible overlapping between some local sensor sets S (I,q) (sensors belonging to more than one local sensor set), the decisions of the N I modules are aggregated and processed combinatorially, applying diagnostic reasoning, in order for the agent M (I) to isolate multiple sensor faults. Then, the decisions of the monitoring agents are processed by global decision logic, aimed at isolating propagated sensor faults.
IV. DISTRIBUTED SENSOR FAULT DETECTION
This section deals with the design of the module M (I,q) , q ∈ {1, . . . , N I }. In the sequel, the dependence of the signals on time (e.g., x(t)) will be dropped for notational brevity.
A. Observer-Based Residual Generation
The estimation model of M (I,q) is formulated by selecting a nonlinear observer O (I,q) , described by
, y
wherex (I,q) ∈ R n I is the estimation of x (I) (based on the sensor measurements y (I,q) withx (I,q) (0) ∈ X (I) ), L (I,q) ∈ R n I ×m I,q is the observer gain matrix, and y
z is the transmitted sensor information, defined in (6) . It is noted that the observer used in this paper is based on the structure of observers for Lipschitz nonlinear systems (see [20] , [21] , and references therein), which is modified appropriately for nonlinearinterconnected subsystems. The jth residual, denoted by ε , satisfieṡ
and y
z H are, respectively, defined through (7) and (6) with f (I,q) = 0 and
as the state estimation error under healthy conditions; taking into account (1) and (10), we obtaiṅ
The stability of the estimation error dynamics under healthy conditions is analyzed in the following lemma. , h (I) , andη (I) , respectively); then, the state estimation error under healthy conditions ε (I,q)
x H (t) is uniformly bounded and satisfies 
where ρ
are positive constants chosen such that |e
are defined in (12) and (13), respectively. Given Assumptions 1-4, we have
By settinḡ
and taking into account Assumption 3, we obtain
,y
Given thatη (I) is locally Lipschitz, we have
Based on (17)- (21), |ε
x H (t)| can be bounded as
is defined in (15) . Applying the BellmanGronwall lemma [22] results in (14) .
It is noted that in the absence of modeling uncertainty and noise, that is, assuming thatη (I) = 0 andd (I,q) = 0,d
x H (t)| converges to zero. The residual under healthy conditions can be expressed as a function of the state estimation error under healthy conditions ε (I,q)
x H (t), i.e.,
with ε (I,q)
x H described by (11)- (13) . If there is no sensor noise and modeling uncertainty, ε (I,q) y jH converges to zero as t → ∞.
B. Computation of Adaptive Thresholds
The jth adaptive threshold, denoted byε
, is designed to bound the residual under healthy conditions ε (I,q) y jH . Using (23) and the solution of (11), we compute the jth adaptive threshold following the procedure presented in the proof of Lemma 4.1. It is noted that for the computation of the jth adaptive threshold, we choose positive constants α
The jth adaptive threshold j ∈ J (I,q) is described bȳ (24) with
where E (I,q) is defined through (15) It is important to note that the jth adaptive threshold can be implemented using linear filters [23] ; i.e.,
The notation W (s)[z(t)] denotes the output of the filter W (s) defined in the Laplace domain with z(t) as input, for any signal z(t). Similarly, the signals Z (I,q) and E (I,q) can be implemented using linear filters. Considering that there is no sensor fault in the local sensor set S (I,q) and the transmitted sensor information, the adaptive threshold under healthy conditions, denoted byε (I,q) y jH (t), is expressed as
where Z (I,q) H corresponds to the right-hand side of (14) . Hence, under healthy conditions
where ε (I,q) y jH is defined in (23).
C. Distributed Sensor Fault Detection Decision Logic
The sensor fault detection decision logic implemented in the module M (I,q) is based on a set of analytical redundancy relations (ARRs), which are dynamical constraints, formulated using the residuals and adaptive thresholds [2] , [24] , [25] . Specifically, the jth ARR, associated with the module M (I,q) is defined as
When the inequality in (31) is true, it is inferred that the ARR E (I,q) j is satisfied. The set of ARRs, based on which the module M (I,q) obtains a decision, is defined as
Therefore, the set E (I,q) is satisfied when E (I,q) j is satisfied for all j ∈ J (I,q) . The distributed sensor fault detection decision logic is formulated by taking into account the robustness and structured fault sensitivity of the set E (I,q) , which are described in the following lemma. z are healthy, the jth residual is described by (23) , that is, ε It is noted that the robustness and structured fault sensitivity properties result from the design of the nonlinear observer, the residuals, and the adaptive thresholds. The robustness property implies that the set of ARRs E (I,q) is insensitive to modeling uncertainties and noise, thus avoiding false alarms. On the other hand, the structured fault sensitivity property entails that E (I,q) is sensitive to a subset of all possible sensor faults that may affect the sensor set S (I) (since S (I,q) ⊂ S (I) ) and the sensor sets monitoring the neighboring subsystems (since S ). The output of M (I,q) , denoted by D (I,q) , is represented by a Boolean function, defined as
is the detection time for the module M (I,q) , defined as
If E (I,q) is always satisfied, then the detection time is defined as T
z is inferred to be faulty, since at least one sensor fault in S z is characterized as nonfaulty, based on the exoneration assumption [17] , [24] , according to which all sensors in S (I,q)
z are exonerated, that is, they are considered as functioning properly, if E (I,q) is satisfied.
V. DISTRIBUTED SENSOR FAULT ISOLATION
The multiple sensor fault isolation is realized in two levels; locally, by combining the decisions of the monitoring modules and globally, by combining the decisions of the monitoring agents of the associated CPS.
A. Multiple Sensor Fault Isolation Decision Logic of CPSs
The monitoring agent M (I) uses a binary fault signature matrix F (I) , consisting of N I rows and Nc I + 2 columns, where Nc I = 2 m I − 1 (m I is the number of sensors in the sensor set S (I) ); the qth row corresponds to the qth set of ARRs E (I,q) , q ∈ {1, . . . , N I }; the ith column, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , Nc I } corresponds to the ith combination of sensor faults that may affect the sensor set S constitute the observed pattern of sensor faults affecting S (I) and S
where i (consistency test) and the diagnosis set is defined as
where I 
, that is, the consistency test provides a diagnosis set with a smaller (or equal) number of diagnosed sensor fault combinations compared to the diagnosis set defined in (38).
The outputs of the agent M 
B. Global Sensor Fault Isolation Decision Logic
The primary goal of the global decision logic G is to isolate sensor faults that have been propagated from neighboring agents. If D for all I ∈ {1, . . . , N}, defined as
The theoretical patterns are the columns of the sensor fault signature matrix 
where: a) F It is important to note that the class of detectable sensor faults satisfying (60) is obtained under worst-case detectability conditions in the sense that they are valid for any modeling uncertainty and measurement noise, given Assumptions 1-4. This condition, in combination with the effects of sensor faults in S (I,q) and propagated sensor faults, can be taken into account during the design of the modules in M (I,q) , since it provides a relationship between the sensor faults
1 , x
2 ] is the state vector with x
being the temperature of output air of the cooling coil and the temperature of the water in the chiller storage tank, respectively, the input u (3) is the chilled water mass flow rate, generated by a backstepping controller, z (3) is the interconnection vector whose elements are the temperature of the two zones, that is,
, and h
z ) is defined in (68) at the bottom of the next page. The parameters used for the simulation of Σ (I) I = 1, 2, and Σ (3) are given [27] . The temperature of each zone is measured by a sensor, denoted by S
{1}, I = 1, 2, while the temperature of the output air of the cooling coil and the chilled water tank are measured by two sensors, denoted by S (3) {1}, S (3) {2}, respectively. For each of the interconnected subsystems, we design a monitoring agent M (I) , I = 1, 2, 3 (Fig. 4) ; the agents M (1) and M (2) monitor the sensors S (1) {1} and S (2) {1}, respectively, using the measurements of S (3) {1} as well (i.e.,
is comprised of two modules M (3, 1) and M (3, 2) that monitor the sensors S (3) {1} and S (3) {2}, respectively; the observer of M (3, 1) estimates the state vector x (3) using the measurements of S (1) {1} and
1 ; y
1 ] ); the estimator of M (3, 2) is used to estimate the state x
2 and is designed by taking into account the dynamic equation of x (3) 2 described by (64)-(68) without using any transmitted sensor information.
The sensor fault signature matrix F (I) designed in the agent M (I) , I = 1, 2 for detecting the presence of faults affecting S (I) {1} and/or S (3) {1} is presented in Table I . The sensor fault signature matrix F (3) of the agent M (3) for isolating multiple faults affecting S (3) {1}, S (3) {2} is presented in Table II , with
1 }, F
2 }, F
1 , f
2 }, F (1) , F (2) , and F (3) (Tables I and II). random, uniformly bounded noise of each sensor S (I) {j}, characterized by (3), is simulated asd Figs. 5 and 6 illustrate the result of the distributed SFDI technique for the first and second simulated scenario, respectively. According to Fig. 5 , at the time instant of 5000 s, the diagnosis set generated by the agents M (1) and M (2) is D (1) , F (2) , and F (3) (Tables I and II). sensor faults, since, as shown in Table I , a violation of the ARR may be due to any sensor fault combination. Hence, their decisions, along with the decision of agent M (3) , are combined and processed by applying the global decision logic. The observed pattern of propagated sensor faults is D z (t) = [1, 1, 0] and is consistent with the pattern F on the agents M (1) and M (2) , as described in Section VI (correspondingly for h (3) in the first scenario).
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a distributed sensor fault detection and isolation technique for interonnected cyber-physical systems. The backbone of the proposed method is the pursuit of two-level diagnosis in the cyber superstratum. The first-level diagnosis is conducted by a bank of monitoring agents, while a global decision logic is applied for conducting the second-level diagnosis. Each monitoring agent is designed to diagnose multiple faults in the sensors of the corresponding, interconnected subsystem, while it is allowed to exchange information with its neighboring agents. The goal of the global decision logic is to isolate multiple sensor faults propagating through the information exchanged between cyber-physical systems. The proposed methodology is analyzed with respect to propagated and local sensor fault effects on the decisions of the monitoring agents and the distributed sensor fault detectability. Future work will involve the application of the proposed scheme to large-scale examples of interconnected cyber-physical systems, such as mobile robotics, intelligent transportation, and smart buildings.
